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Abstract
The control of highly infectious diseases of livestock such as classical swine fever, foot-and-mouth disease, and
avian influenza is fraught with ethical, economic, and public health dilemmas. Attempts to control outbreaks of
these pathogens rely on massive culling of infected farms, and farms deemed to be at risk of infection.
Conventional approaches usually involve the preventive culling of all farms within a certain radius of an infected
farm. Here we propose a novel culling strategy that is based on the idea that farms that have the highest
expected number of secondary infections should be culled first. We show that, in comparison with conventional
approaches (ring culling), our new method of risk based culling can reduce the total number of farms that need to
be culled, the number of culled infected farms (and thus the expected number of human infections in case of a
zoonosis), and the duration of the epidemic. Our novel risk based culling strategy requires three pieces of
information, viz. the location of all farms in the area at risk, the moments when infected farms are detected, and an
estimate of the distance-dependent probability of transmission.
Introduction
Epidemics of infectious diseases such as classical swine
fever, food-and-mouth, and avian influenza continue to
wreak havoc in commercial livestock [1-6]. Efforts to
control such outbreaks rely heavily on culling of infected
farms, and farms in the vicinity of infected farms. This
approach induces massive economic costs and leads to
great animal suffering. It is therefore desirable to make
as efficient as possible use of the available resources,
and to spare as many animals as possible. Furthermore,
in case of diseases that have zoonotic potential, such as
highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses of the H5
and H7 subtypes, it is also important to minimize the
risk of human exposure [7-11].
The aim of preventive culling in outbreaks of com-
mercial livestock is to contain the epidemic by removing
susceptible flocks in the vicinity of infected farms; a
typical strategy used for this is ring culling. In this strat-
egy all farms within a certain radius of an infected farm
are culled, typically starting close to the infected farm(s).
The distance to an infected farm is related to the prob-
ability of a farm becoming infected. Ring culling
therefore essentially involves culling the farms with the
highest probability of becoming infected. We argue that,
in addition to the distance to infected farms, another
factor that is important is the local density of neigh-
bouring farms. The local density determines how an epi-
demic is likely to develop, e.g.: a farm in an area with
high density will likely cause more new infections than a
farm in area with a low density; this implicitly follows
from the relationship between distance and risk. In pre-
vious work the number of new infections that each
infected farm is expected to cause was quantified by a
farm reproduction number (R) and they were used to
create risk maps that indicated areas with potential for
high epidemic spread [12].
In this paper a novel culling strategy is introduced
that takes into account not only the distance of suscep-
tible farms to the infected farms, but also the number of
secondary infections that a susceptible farm is expected
to produce should it become infected. Specifically, we
calculated for each farm not yet (known to be) infected
a so-called risk value, which represents the number of
infections the farm is expected to produce given current
information on the unfolding of the epidemic. We argue
that farms which rank highest in the risk based ordering
should be culled first, thereby achieving an efficient allo-
cation of resources (i.e. time, money, equipment). In
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practice, the risk value of each susceptible farm is given
by the probability that a farm will become infected in a
certain time span multiplied by the reproduction num-
ber of the farm once it is infected. Similar ideas that
incorporate the connectivity of farms or individuals in
applying an intervention measure have been suggested
before in (non-spatial) network models of infectious dis-
ease spread [13]. For example by vaccinating friends’ of
friends which proved to be more effective than vaccinat-
ing people at random [14]. Similar is also the strategy to
vaccinate children with the aim to reduce disease trans-
mission [15] or to preferentially vaccinate large urban
centres to reduce their role as disease reservoirs [16].
Our risk based culling scheme works with three pieces
of information. First the locations of all farms in the
area at risk need to be known. Second, an assessment
of the current state of the epidemic should be available,
in particular which farms are infected, and which farms
are still susceptible. Third, an estimate of how the
transmission probability depends on the distance
between infected and susceptible farms should be at
hand. The first two pieces are usually readily available
during an epidemic. For the third piece of information
estimates from past epidemics can usually be used
[1,4,12,17].
We evaluate the performance of the risk based culling
strategy in a simulation study that is loosely based on a
large outbreak of highly pathogenic H7N7 avian influ-
enza in the Netherlands. Parameter values and the
transmission hazard are based on experience with this
outbreak [6,12]. Throughout we systematically compare
the effectiveness of our risk based culling strategy with
the traditional approach that relies on the culling of
farms in a ring (1-3 km) around infected premises. The
comparisons are based on (1) the number of infected
farms culled, which is related to the expected number of
human infections, (2) the duration of the epidemic, and
(3), the total number of farms culled.
Materials and methods
Modelling
The spread between farms was modelled with a stochas-
tic SEIR model (Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed)
that operates with fixed time steps of 1 day. The prob-
ability qi that a susceptible farm i is infected on a parti-
cular day t is given by:
qi(t) = 1 − e−λi(t), (1)
where li(t), the force of infection on farm i at day t, is
calculated according to:
λi(t) =
∑
j =i
h(rij) · 1[j is infectious]. (2)
The function h(rij) is called the transmission kernel. It
is defined as the infection hazard posed by farm j to
farm i as a function of the inter-farm distance rij [12], 1
is an indicator function that is 1 if j is infected (Figure
1) and 0 otherwise. In equation 2 it is assumed that
transmission between farms is distance dependent,
which for many outbreaks provided a satisfactory
description of the data [1,4,12,17]. A number of
mechanisms may be able to cause spread from farm to
farm. Virus may for example be carried over by people,
vehicles, or wind. In our model we adopt a phenomeno-
logical approach, and do not explicitly model different
transmission mechanisms.
Although it is our goal to investigate the efficiency of
risk based culling strategies in general, the parameters
are specifically tailored to mimic the spatial spread of
highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in densely
populated poultry areas. The shape of the hazard and
estimates of the parameters to scale the hazard were
estimated from the outbreak of highly pathogenic H7N7
avian influenza in the Netherlands [12]. The shape that
fitted best was of the form:
h(r) =
h0
1 +
(
r/
r0
)α , (3)
Figure 1 Classification of the farms in the model. Farms are
either susceptible to infection, infected but not yet infectious
(exposed), infected and infectious, detected and not infectious
anymore, or removed from the system by culling.
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where h0, r0, and a are parameters of the hazard func-
tion (Table 1), and r is the distance between farms.
We assume that upon infection each farm first
becomes exposed (i.e. infected but not yet infectious)
for a period of two days (Figure 1) [12,18]. After the
exposed period has elapsed the farm is assumed to
be infectious until it is detected. Here we assume for
simplicity that upon detection the farm immediately
ceases to be infectious to other farms, e.g., due to
appropriate biosafety measures. In our simulation
the time between becoming infectious to becoming
detected is drawn from a gamma distribution with a
mean (T) of 7 days and a shape parameter (c) of 100
(Figures 1 and 2a). Culling in the model is done (as
in reality) with limited daily capacity. Farms that are
culled are removed from the system, and cease to
play a role in the infection dynamics. The culling
capacity is assumed to be low at start of the epi-
demic and then increases quickly reaching a maxi-
mum after 11 days (Figure 2b) and is based on the
situation of 2003 [6]. We assume that culling of
detected infected farms is given priority above pre-
ventive culling. Each time step all detected infected
farms are therefore culled first providing capacity is
available (Figure 1 and Figure 2b). If the number of
infected farms is larger than the culling capacity on
a particular day then the infected farms detected last
are culled the next day(s). If the culling capacity is
greater than the number of detected infected farms
then the remaining culling capacity is used for pre-
ventive culling. Preventively culled farms, whether
they were susceptible, exposed or infected, become
removed (Figure 1).
Culling strategies
We now define in more detail the two culling strategies
considered in this paper: ring culling and risk based cul-
ling. With ring culling all farms within a certain radius
of any of the farms where an infection was detected are
preventively culled. Culling is then continued until there
are no more farms present in any of the (possibly over-
lapping) rings around infected farms. Ring culling is
typically carried out inside-out, i.e. starting near the
infected farm on the inside of the ring. In our model
this is mimicked by consistently selecting the farm that
is closest to a farm where an infection has been
detected. An alternative ring culling strategy works from
the outside of the ring to the inside. The rationale for
this strategy is that it may help contain the infection
within the culling ring. In this strategy the farm that is
furthest away (but within the ring) of any farm where
an infection was detected is culled first. In The Nether-
lands in 2003 culling was started on the inside of the
ring close to the infected farms. At the start of the epi-
demic a 1 km ring was used, and later in the epidemic 3
km rings were used. In our analysis we consider both
these radii. In our calculations for outside-in ring culling
we considered a scenario with a ring radius of 3 km.
With risk based culling the estimated number of infec-
tions each farm is expected to create is used as culling
criterion. The candidate farm with the highest expected
number of new infections is then preventively culled
first. The expected number of infections Ei for farm i is
Table 1 Settings of the hazard kernel (equation 3) as
used in the base scenario and the scenarios of the
sensitivity analyses
Base hazard kernel h0 0.0016
r0 1.9
a 2.1
Increased R0 h0 0.0020
Decreased R0 h0 0.0012
Increased tail h0 0.0009
r0 1.9
a 1.4
Decreased tail h0 0.0023
r0 1.9
A 2.8
Increased clustering h0 0.0012
Decreased clustering h0 0.0020
Misspecified kernel 0.00028
Only the modifications of the base scenario are shown. For the scenario with
the misspecified kernel, the hazard is constant.
Figure 2 Overview of model parameters. (a) Distribution of the
days to detection of an infected farm, (b) Culling capacity as a
function of the time since detection of the outbreak, (c) Hazard
kernels with an increased and decreased tail, and the misspecified
kernel, (d) Hazard kernels with increased and decreased capacity.
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given by the product of the probability that farm i is
infected (qi, equation 1) and its reproduction number
(Ri, equation 7):
Ei = Ri · qi. (6)
Assuming a gamma distributed infectious period with
mean T and a shape parameter (c) of 100, the reproduc-
tion value (Ri) is calculated for each remaining farm
(not detected, not culled), only taking into account all
other remaining farms, as follows [12]:
Ri =
∑
j=i
{
1 −
(
c
c + T · h(rij)
)c}
, (7)
where i and j run through all farms that are not
detected and that not have been culled.
The exact probability for a farm to become infected
(qi, equation 1) can in practise not be calculated dur-
ing the epidemic as this would require complete
knowledge on which farms are currently infected (also
the ones that are yet undetected). However, it is possi-
ble to approximately calculate the risk that farms were
infected in the past based on knowledge of the
detected infections. In this calculation, we first assume
that all detected farms have been infectious for exactly
T days (mean infectious period, seven days). We note
that this assumption could be dropped if detailed
knowledge on the infectious period of the source were
available during the epidemic. Then we approximate
how much exposure each farm has had in the past T
days. Suppose one particular farm j is detected as
infected at time tjd. This means that all neighbouring
farms have been exposed to this infected farm for the
previous T days. If on one particular neighbouring
farm no infection is detected up until x days after the
detection of its infected neighbour (with x smaller than
or equal to T) it should have escaped infection by that
infected neighbour for at least T-x days (Figure 3). In
agreement with this we estimate an approximate
cumulative hazard li* of infection for each farm i
where no infection was detected up until time t
according to:
λ∗i (t) =
∑
j=i
h(rij) ·
(
T − min(t − tjd,T)
)
. (8)
The hazard is approximate (as indicated with the *)
because farms that are infected but have not been yet
been detected are not taken into account because these
are unknown at that point in time. The approximate
probability (qi*) that farm i was infected in the past
based can be calculated according to
q∗
i
(t) = 1 − e−λ∗i (t). (9)
This probability is used to calculate the approximate
expected number of infections caused by farm i:
E∗i = Ri · q∗i . (10)
E∗i is used to rank the farms according to risk in order
to determine the order for risk based preventive culling.
In our model we used a risk threshold ("thr”) below
which farms are not culled anymore. In our model cal-
culations we analyze the sensitivity of our results to
changes in the threshold value.
Simulation details
The efficiency of various conventional ring culling stra-
tegies and the novel risk based culling strategy were
assessed using simulations of outbreaks on maps with
randomly generated farm locations (see Additional file
1, Supplementary text and Additional file 2, Figure S1).
Each map consisted of a circular inner area of 1000
farms with a density of 3.8 farms per m2 and an outer
(ring-shaped) area of 1000 farms with a density of 0.5
farms per m2. The density assumed in the inner area is
equal to the density in the largest poultry area of the
Netherlands which is where most of the 2003 epidemic
of avian influenza occurred. The density of the outer
area is the density observed in the remainder of The
Netherlands.
To prevent early stochastic fade-out, and to condition
on a large epidemic, all simulations were seeded with 10
infectious and 10 exposed farms (Figure 4). The starting
configuration of the 10 infectious and 10 exposed farms
was itself created with the transmission model (equa-
tions 1-3 and Figure 1). The first infected farm was ran-
domly selected. The start-up simulation was run until
Figure 3 Overview of how to calculate the approximate risk
that farms were infected in the past based on knowledge of
the detected infections (equation 8). In the example below, at
day 7 an infected farm is identified as being infected. On day 7 a
neighboring farm has on average been exposed to the infected
farm for the last 7 days. If the susceptible farm was not detected as
being infected then on day 8, it has been on average exposed for 6
days. And so on, until day 14 when on average there is no further
exposure. In equation 5 at, for example, day 9, t = 9, tjd = 7, and T
= 7 which results in 5 days exposure.
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10 farms were infectious and 10 farms were exposed. In
this manner we generated 50 different random starting
configurations. For each culling scenario considered we
did 400 simulations in which we used each map 8 times.
For base-line values for the kernel parameters (Table 1)
we carried out 2000 additional simulations (40 per map)
for three of the culling strategies to evaluate the perfor-
mance of these culling strategies per map.
In a future epidemic the exact shape of the hazard
kernel of the disease spread is likely to be unknown. We
therefore tested the sensitivity of the results to changes
in the hazard kernel (Table 1), while the kernel to calcu-
late the risk as a basis for preventive culling was left
unchanged. Specifically, we considered two additional
scenarios, one with a heavy-tailed kernel, and one in
which the tail of the kernel falls of more quickly than in
the default scenario (Figure 2d). We also investigated a
situation with a more extensive difference between the
hazard kernel used to calculate the disease risk and the
actual hazard kernel of the disease spread (i.e. a misspe-
cified kernel). For this we used a kernel that has equal
disease spread disease up to 10 km (Figure 2c). The
hazard kernels were adjusted so that the average repro-
duction number across all maps was the same for all
three scenarios (i.e. R = 1.65) (Table 1). We furthermore
considered scenarios with a high (R = 2.1) and low (R =
1.2) reproduction number (Table 1 and Figure 2d).
Finally, in the base scenario the maximum culling capa-
city was fixed at 24 farms per day. To investigate the
robustness of our results to the exact culling capacity
we investigated scenarios with an increased (32 farms
per day) or decreased (16 farms per day) culling
capacity.
The relevant outputs of the model are the total num-
ber of farms culled, the number of infectious farms
culled, and the duration of the epidemic (defined as the
time from the first detection until the last culling of an
infected farm). The total number of farms that are
culled and the duration of the epidemic are both mea-
sures with economic relevance, not only because of the
direct costs of culling, but also because under EU regu-
lations borders will be closed for export during (an for
some period after) an epidemic of avian influenza.
Furthermore, minimizing animal suffering in itself is a
worthy goal. The number of farms that are culled while
being infectious is relevant because it determines the
level of human exposure to an agent with zoonotic
potential [7-11].
The simulation results obtained contain three sources
of variation, i.e. (1) the culling strategy, (2) the random
maps, and (3) the stochastic epidemic process. To sepa-
rate these variances, and to single out the effect of the
culling strategy, we analyzed the simulation results with
a linear mixed model that used the maps as a random
effect and the culling strategy as a fixed effect. The
mixed model was used to estimate confidence bounds
for the effect of the various culling strategies.
Results
Risk based culling reduced the number of infected farms
culled compared to both 1 and 3 km ring culling strate-
gies, and thereby should be able to reduce the number
of human infections (Table 2). Of three criteria by
which we tested the control strategies, (1) number of
infected farms culled, (2) total number of farms culled,
and (3) duration of the epidemic, risk based culling out-
performed ring culling always on two out of three cri-
teria. On the third criterion it typically performs either
equally well or slightly better (Tables 2 and 3). Risk
based culling has a much lower number of infected and
total number of farms culled compared to 3 km ring
culling, and usually shortens the length of the epidemic
(depending on the risk threshold). Compared to 1 km
ring culling, risk based culling has a lower number of
infected farms culled, and the duration of the epidemic
is shorter. The total number of farms culled is either
equal or lower (depending on the risk threshold).
There was substantial variation between the maps. Per
map the relative improvement of risk based culling over
ring culling remained approximately the same. The
Figure 4 Examples of outbreaks (a) homogeneous Poisson
clustered, (b) moderately clustered (base scenario), and (c)
clustered map. Left graph shows a starting position with infected
farms in red, the right graph shows an end situation with culled
farms in blue.
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Table 2 Simulation results for the various risk based and ring culling strategies in the base scenario
Culling strategy Culled infected Total farms culled Epidemic in days
Risk based, thresh = 0.001 216 (194;239) 958 (920;971) 57 (58;59)
Risk based, thresh = 0.0005 -3 (-11;5) +114 (100;128) -3 (-4;-2)
Risk based, thresh = 0.005 +3 (-5;11) -72 (-86;-58) +3 (2;4)
Risk based, thresh = 0.001/3 km ring1) +5 (-3;13) +82 (68;96) -2 (-3;-1)
Ring 1 km, In - > Out 2) +32 (24;40) +125 (111;139) +4 (3;5)
Ring 3 km, In - > Out 3) +27 (19;35) +597 (583;611) +0 (-1;1)
Ring 3 km, Out - > In +111 (103;119) +674 (660;688) +7 (6;8)
Brackets indicate 95% confidence interval.
The results of “Risk based, thresh = 0.001” with confidence bounds were estimated as the intercept of a mixed model that incorporated maps as a random effect
and culling strategy as a fixed effect. The “+” or “-” for the alternative strategies indicate the difference compared to “Risk based, thresh = 0.001”. Confidence
bounds for the alternative strategies are also around the difference.
1) Risk based culling in a 3 km ring.
2) In - > Out: culling starts with farms that are closest to the infected farm.
3) Out - > In: culling starts with farms within the ring that are farthest from the infected farm.
Table 3 Overview of results obtained with various scenarios used in the sensitivity analysis
Scenario Culling strategy Culled infected Total farms culled Epidemic in days
Decreased capacity Risk, thresh = 0.001 374 (329;420) 996 (964;1027) 72 (71;74)
Ring 1 km, In - > Out 1) +46 (32;60) +223 (209;237) +4 (3;5)
Ring 3 km, In - > Out 2) +57 (43;71) +704 (690;718) +4 (3;5)
Increased capacity Risk, thresh = 0.001 161 (145;176) 1064 (1038;1090) 47 (46;47)
Ring 1 km, In - > Out +20 (15;25) -70 (-83;-56) +8 (7;9)
Ring 3 km, In - > Out +16 (11;21) +410 (396;423) +1 (0;2)
Increased R0 Risk, thresh = 0.001 460 (412;507) 1250 (1224;1276) 65 (64;66)
Ring 1 km, In - > Out +64 (50;77) +108 (98;119) +5 (4;6)
Ring 3 km, In - > Out +61 (47;74) +543 (532;553) +2 (1;3)
Decreased R0 Risk, thresh = 0.001 100 (91;110) 798 (771;825) 44 (43;45)
Ring 1 km, In - > Out +13 (9;16) +4 (-12;20) +7 (6;9)
Ring 3 km, In - > Out +14 (10;17) +509 (493;525) +3 (1;4)
Increased tail Risk, thresh = 0.001 183 (169;197) 1076 (1050;1103) 59 (58;60)
Ring 1 km, In - > Out +23 (16;30) +40 (25;55) +5 (4;6)
Ring 3 km, In - > Out +18 (11;25) +632 (617;647) +2 (1;3)
Decreased tail Risk, thresh = 0.001 220 193;247 958 (986;929) 50 (49;51)
Ring 1 km, In - > Out +35 (27;42) +34 (19;48) +7 (6;8)
Ring 3 km, In - > Out +29 (21;36) +396 (381;411) +3 (2;4)
Less clustering Risk, thresh = 0.001 191 (175;206) 1003 (983;1023) 55 (54;56)
Ring 1 km, In - > Out +33 (23;44) -14 (-32;4) +8 (7;10)
Ring 3 km, In - > Out +31 (21;42) +443 (426;461) +3 (1;4)
More clustering Risk, thresh = 0.001 277 (222;332) 1127 (1079;1176) 57 (55;59)
Ring 1 km, In - > Out +43 (31;55) +186 (163;210) +6 (4;7)
Ring 3 km, In - > Out +38 (26;50) +624 (601;648) +4 (3;5)
Misspecified kernel Risk, thresh = 0.001 255 (231;278) 1095 (1069;1121) 59 (58;60)
Ring 1 km, In - > Out +24 (15;32) +19 (6;32) +4 (3;5)
Ring 3 km, In - > Out +25 (16;33) +397 (384;410) +1 (0;2)
Brackets indicate 95% confidence interval.
The results of “Risk based, thresh = 0.001” with confidence bounds were estimated as the intercept of a mixed model that incorporated maps as a random effect
and culling strategy as a fixed effect. The “+” or “-” for 1 km and 3 km ring culling indicate the difference compared to “Risk based, thresh = 0.001”. Confidence
bounds for 1 km and 3 km ring are also around the difference.
1) In - > Out: culling starts with farms that are closest to the infected farm.
2) Out - > In: culling starts with farms within the ring that are farthest from the infected farm.
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mean number of infected farms per map culled (across
the three main strategies) ranged from 82 to 474, the
total number of farms culled ranged from 956 to 1423,
and the duration of the epidemic ranged from 53 to 64.
The performance of each strategy per map was studied
by carrying out an additional 2000 simulations per strat-
egy, i.e. 40 for each map. On 6 out of 50 maps 1 km
ring culling had a lower total number of farms culled
than risk based culling, and 3 km ring culling gave a
shorter epidemic on 5 maps. With the exception of
these, risk based culling consistently outperformed 1 km
and 3 km ring culling.
In the sensitivity analyses we investigated the effect of
changes in culling capacity, reproduction number, tail of
the hazard kernel, the level of clustering of farms, and a
misspecified hazard kernel (Table 3). Qualitatively, the
results remained the same in all sensitivity analyses. In
all scenarios risk based culling outperformed ring culling
on two or three criteria. Quantitatively, the total or
infected number of farms culled, and the length of the
epidemic varied greatly between the scenarios. The rela-
tive improvement of risk based culling over ring culling,
however, remained approximately the same.
Discussion
Preventive culling of farms is an important control mea-
sure to halt epidemics of highly infectious diseases of
livestock such as classical swine fever, foot-and-mouth
disease, and avian influenza. This paper introduces a
novel prioritization scheme for culling of farms that is
based on the idea that farms with the highest expected
number of secondary infections should be culled first.
Our simulations show that risk based culling outper-
forms ring culling in terms of the number of infected
farms culled, the total number of farms culled, and the
duration of the epidemic. As risk based culling reduced
the number of infected farms that are culled it is there-
fore also expected to reduce the number of human
infections. We find substantial variation in the outcome
between different maps but for a given map risk based
culling consistently outperformed ring culling. This indi-
cates that the spatial structure has a large influence on
the outcome of an epidemic, which is supported by pre-
vious research [4,17,19-21].
Although the model presented here is parameterised
for the avian influenza epidemic that occurred in The
Netherlands in 2003, the methodology of risk based cul-
ling is more generally applicable to other infectious dis-
eases controlled by culling. The only information
needed are the locations of the farms, the moments at
which infected farms were culled (both essential for any
control and usually available from surveillance), and an
estimate of the distance-dependent probability of trans-
mission. An extension of our method that could
potentially further improve risk based culling would be
to not only focus on the expected number of infections
within one infection generation, but try to estimate the
expected number of infections in second and perhaps
even third infection generations in the future.
We assumed that all farms are equally infectious
which is reasonable for avian influenza [12] but for
other diseases this may be different. Variability in sus-
ceptibility and infectivity can also be taken into account
in risk based culling, proving estimates are available.
One example where such variability existed is foot-and-
mouth outbreak in the UK. For this epidemic a model
was derived that is similar to the model used in this
paper [3,4,17] and it can be used to calculate the prob-
ability of infection and reproduction number per farm
as needed for risk based culling.
It is possible with an extensive misspecification in, for
example, the infectivity of farms that risk based culling
would be less effective. Note though that alternative
strategies (such as ring culling) may suffer similarly. The
challenge here is to have a good epidemiological under-
standing of how a disease spreads and incorporate this
knowledge into the calculations. We believe that if mis-
specifications are minor, the reproductive number still
identifies patches of farms that are close together
weighted by their distance to infected farms. Quantita-
tively the outcomes may differ to some extent but quali-
tatively (risk based culling is about prioritizing) they
may still be accurate. The effectiveness of risk based cul-
ling also depends on the culling capacity relative to the
spread of disease. If the culling capacity is too low any
control is impossible. If the culling capacity is very high
then the order of culling becomes irrelevant. In between
these extremes, culling resources need to be used effi-
ciently and risk based culling can aid in this.
One advantage of risk based culling is that it does
not require a certain arbitrary ring to be set. It can be
argued however that the threshold needed in risk
based culling to set the minimum risk level for culling
is also arbitrary, and there is indeed not one clear risk
based threshold (thr) that achieves the best results
across all three criteria. If the threshold is decreased,
the number of farms culled is increased and the pool
of susceptible farms depletes quicker, which means an
epidemic is stopped earlier. An epidemic that stops
more rapidly is likely going to have less infected farms
culled, and thus less human infections. Vice versa, if
the threshold is increased, the total number of farms
culled decreases but the length of the epidemic and
the number of infected farms culled increase. Which
strategy is best thus depends what goals decision
makers want to achieve. Economically the cost of the
total number of farms culled and the cost of a longer
epidemic can be weighted. The impact on public
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health (human casualties) is however difficult to weigh
and are dependent on the disease. With a disease like
avian influenza which has a clear zoonotic potential
reducing the public health impact is arguably the most
important.
For policy makers our risk based culling policy may be
more difficult to justify to stake holders and the public
than the simple traditional ring culling strategy. In addi-
tion, to be acceptable any culling strategy would have to
satisfy the requirements of regulatory bodies. An intui-
tively appealing strategy may be to apply a risk based
prioritization scheme within a culling ring. In our results
this proved to be quite efficient (as shown in Table 2),
primarily because most farms that are selected in a risk
based prioritization scheme are located within a ring of
3 km from an infected farm (Table 2).
In the past mainly ring culling strategies have been
considered in practice and literature [3,4,20,22]. In
[20,22] a strategy was modelled that prioritised farms
with high probability of infection. In this work the prob-
ability of infection per farm was based on the distance
to the infected farms weighted by the number of sheep
and cows. In risk based culling selection of farms is
done by combining the probability of infection (depen-
dent on distance to the infected farms) with the repro-
duction number (dependent on the local density of
farms). Our results demonstrate that including the local
density of farms to determine the order of preventive
culling to control an epidemic is a promising strategy.
This paper provides a guideline that could help improve
the effectiveness of culling.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Supplementary text: Description of random map
generation.
Additional file 2: Figure S1: Border corrected Ripley’s K for random
maps.
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